This post includes selections from my Extended Essay, written over the summer of 2017, which defends Benhabib’s Communicative Ethics from universalist and concrete perspectives. In this excerpt I’ve shared, I revise Benhabib’s distinction between contexts of justification and aplication, concluding that situations requiring dialogue to reach conclusions require participants to operate on a spectrum between justification and application.
Seyla Benhabib, in her exploration of the embodied self, differentiates between two conceptions of identity: The Generalized and the Concrete Other. Rawlsian and other modern universalist modern philosophers assume the standpoint of the “Generalized Other,” in which the self is a being imbued with rationality but devoid of identity characteristics like race and gender. However, Benhabib notes that in opposition to the aversion of thinkers of the Enlightenment tradition to acknowledging empirical features of identity, feminist theorists such as Carol Gilligan have identified through psychological studies that empirically, a Concrete Other exists. As Benhabib terms it, the Concrete Other is a conception of identity which understands the self as a being comprised of its individual history, identity, and desires. As Benhabib puts it[1]:
The standpoint of the Concrete Other, by contrast, requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional constitution. In assuming this standpoint, we abstract from what constitutes our commonality. We seek to comprehend the needs of the other, his or her motivations, what s/he searches for, and what s/he desires.
Though modern universalist philosophers posit the “generalized” and “concrete” others as selves in binary opposition, Benhabib’s thesis is that reconciling the two is necessary for a moral theory, because both conceptions of the self are important in different instances. As a solution and mode of reconciliation of the two selves, Benhabib proposes an ethic she terms the Communicative Ethic, which consists of four principles:
- A dialogue where participants inquire about what others would want if they were the affected party.
- That there are no epistemic constraints within this dialogue, e.g. that both empirical and a priori ways of knowing are valid, giving merit to both the Generalized and Concrete selves.
- That there are no restrictions on the moral domain, i.e. all choices merit ethical consideration because they all involve value judgments and interactions with others.
- That the “rules” and guidelines of the dialogue are subject to change.
In “In Defense of Universalism: Yet Again!”[2] Benhabib revisits the Communicative Ethic and answers objections to it, by clarifying her stance that discourse solves back objections to the Communicative Ethic. When misrecognition of the Concrete Other and their desires occurs, speaking about it and correcting the misunderstanding is the only way to begin to resolve the issue.
Though I believe that Benhabib’s Communicative Ethics presents a better model than Young’s asymmetrical reciprocity, I find her clarification of appropriate contexts for the Concrete and Generalized Others in “In Defense of Universalism” lacking. She clarifies, in response to James Sterba’s objections, that she considers two perspectives: the moral standpoint and the standpoint of institutional justice[3]. However, Benhabib’s presentation of these two standpoints fails because it is overly binaristic; we ought to conceptualize ethical choices and relationships instead on a spectrum between the individual/moral standpoint and the institutional standpoint. Following Benhabib’s model, the Concrete Other aligns with the moral end of the spectrum, and the Generalized Other aligns with the justice end of the spectrum.
Benhabib is right that at two extremes exist the micro-level, interpersonal interactions (the moral standpoint) and the society-wide justice frameworks that Rawls refers to. However, there are varying degrees of overlap between the two. Consider a classroom setting, where teachers and professors must establish fair rules for student activity, but also grant extensions, write letters of recommendation, and develop comfortable relationships with students. The teacher must regard her students as both Concrete and General. In such a setting, we are required to hold develop a Generalized and Concrete analysis in tandem.
Even though we cannot deliberate forever, Benhabib argues in “In Defense of Universalism” that some discussion, however limited, will always be better than nothing. However, I believe that the spectrum understanding proves why it is not necessary to deliberate endlessly. The closer a situation is to the moral standpoint, the more a dialogue per the Communicative Ethic would be necessary to make a judgment. However, for scenarios that represent more of a “middle ground” between the moral and institutional contexts, the Generalized knowledge participants have of the other can substitute for deficiencies in a participant’s explanation of themselves and their motivations. If participants were hypothetically constrained by time or context and could only speak with another participant for a short time, assumptions made about the other person based on generalized features of agency, such as a human tendency for rational choice, can help participants reason deductively about what a participant may want given the information conveyed in the dialogue.
To consider both the requirements of the Concrete and Generalized conceptions of the self, Benhabib makes a distinction between contexts of justification, where we develop institutions consistent with principles of justice, and contexts of application, where institutional policies are applied (e.g. in the creation of laws). In contexts of justification, Benhabib argues that the context of justifying institutional frameworks requires attention to the Generalized Other, whereas the context of applying those frameworks requires attention to the Concrete Other. I argue that this framework is not fully explained and requires further development, which viewing the distinction between the moral and institutional standpoints per the spectrum model may resolve.
The spectrum model also helps explain further how “group differentiated rights” that Benhabib discusses in “In Defense of Universalism” can be applied. Situations where a group (that shares common identity) requests differential treatment under the law represent a “middle ground” scenario between the moral and institutional justice standpoints, because the groups reference a personal identity feature as justification for a claim to a certain application of a justice framework to their group. In order for lawmakers not to substitute a mistaken understanding of what policy solutions group members would want, they must consult members of the group. However, it would be impossible for all the nuances and intricacies of an individual group member’s opinion, which have been shaped by their personal experiences, to reflect accurately the opinion of the entire group. The solution for lawmakers would be to make deductive inferences to legislate a solution they believe could satisfy all group members, before presenting the intermediate piece of legislation to the group for further deliberation and review. Lawmakers would need to attend to both the Concrete and Generalized Other, proving that the distinction between the standpoint of morality and the standpoint of institutional justice is hazy and best viewed as a spectrum. Furthermore, the deductive model of satisfying “group differentiated” rights claims presents the best framework for policymaking in a cosmopolitan world, on account of the ways in which it opens up the process to deliberation and mitigates the effects of substitution.
[1] Benhabib, Seyla. The Generalized and The Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory. Praxis International, 1985.
[2] Benhabib, Seyla. “In Defense of Universalism. Yet Again! A Response to Critics of Situating the Self.” New German Critique, no. 62, 1994, pp. 173–189, http://www.jstor.org/stable/488515.
[3] Ibid.
